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What They Died to Defend: Freedom of
Speech and Military Funeral Protests
Cynthia Mosher*
I. Introduction
"GOD HATES FAGS!" "THANK GOD FOR I.E.D.S!" "FAGS
DOOM NATIONS!"' These are not the words most people expect to
hear when laying a loved one to rest. For the families of soldiers killed
in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, words like these are all too familiar.2
In recent years, the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC), a small
congregation located in Topeka, Kansas,3 has become infamous for
protesting homosexuality by picketing outside fallen soldiers' funerals.4
Understandably, the church's practices have upset, disgusted, and even
outraged soldiers' families,
5  members of the media,6  veterans,
7
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1. Westboro Baptist Church FAQ: Who, http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/
faq.html#Who (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) [hereinafter WBC FAQ: Who].
2. See, e.g., Denny Boyles, Ordinance Targets Protests: Fresno Council Orders a
Measure to Bar Military Funeral Demonstrations, THE FRESNO BEE, Nov. 1, 2006, at B4
[hereinafter Boyles, Ordinance Targets Protests].
3. About Westboro Baptist Church, http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/
aboutwbc.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) [hereinafter About WBC].
4. See Editorial, Freedom's Price: Our View Hate Groups, Though Deplorable,
Have Rights Too, SPOKESMAN-REV., Aug. 11, 2006, at 6B [hereinafter Hate Groups];
Shawn Zeller, Fred Phelps Spurs Legal Spat, CQ WEEKLY, Sept. 18, 2006, at 2425.
5. See Snyder v. Phelps, No. RDB061389, 2006 WL 3081106, at *1 (D. Md. 2006)
(suit by father of slain marine against the WBC for content displayed on the church's
website).
6. See, e.g., Jim Belshaw, Protesters an Insult to Free Speech, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Sept. 22, 2006, at B 1.
7. See Boyles, Ordinance Targets Protests, supra note 2, at B4;
FirstAmendmentCenter.org, News: Legislators Propose Bills Barring Protests at
Funerals, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/new.aspx?id=16064 (last visited Sept.
28, 2006) [hereinafter Legislators Propose Bills]; Kevin Wingert, Funeral Protests:
Legislators, Community Members Offer Thoughts on Possibility of Statewide Ban, WYO.
TRIB.-EAGLE, Sept. 4, 2006, http://www.wyomingnews.com/articles/2006/09/04/news/
local news/Ollocal_09-04-06.txt. Other veterans, while disagreeing with the WBC's
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legislators,8 and other concerned citizens.
9
Kansas became the first state to respond to public demands to ban
picketing at funerals when it passed the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act in
1992.10 It was not until recently," however, that other states started
enacting legislation barring protests at funerals.12 In 2006, legislatures
activities, believe that as soldiers they fought for the ability of everyone, including
members of the WBC, to exercise freedom of speech. See, e.g., H.R. 94-102, Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 2006) ("You have to remember, this is one of the things I fought for from 1942 to
1945. And that was the right to speak your mind, the right to petition and grieve your
government." (quoting World War Two veteran)).
8. See Legislators Propose Bills, supra note 7 ("Quite honestly I'd never heard of
anybody ever protesting a funeral. It was really pretty disgusting." (quoting Missouri
State Senator Charlie Shields)); Senators Durbin, Chambliss, Bayh, Conrad Introduce Bi-
Partisan Respect for Funerals of Fallen Heroes Act, U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://durbin.senate.gov/record.cftn?id=264285&& ("Disrupting military funerals goes
beyond the bounds of decency. It must stop and it must stop now." (quoting Senator
Conrad)).
9. See Patriot Guard Riders, Home, http://patriotguard.org/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2006) [hereinafter Riders, Home].
10. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (2005) (amended Apr. 12, 2007).
11. With the exception of Massachusetts, which enacted its statute in 2000, it was
not until 2006 that most states began passing laws that prohibit picketing at funerals. See
infra note 90.
12. States that have adopted statutes prohibiting protests at funerals include
Alabama, see ALA. CODE § 13A- 11-17 (2006); Arkansas, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71 -
230 (West 2006); see California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.35 (West 2007); Colorado, see
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-9-101, 18-9-106 to -108, 13-21-126, 18-9-117, 18-9-125 (2006);
Connecticut, see 2007 Conn. Acts page no. 98 (Reg. Sess.); Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 871.01 (West 2007); Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2006); Idaho, see
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6409 (2007); Indiana, see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3 (West
2006); Iowa, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5 (West 2007); Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4015 (2005) (amended Apr. 12, 2007); Kentucky, see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 525.145, 525.155 (West 2006); Louisiana, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (2006);
Maine, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 501-A (2007); Maryland, see MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. Law, § 10-205 (West 2006); Massachusetts, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
272 § 42A (West 2006); Michigan, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d (West
2006); Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West 2006); Mississippi, see Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West 2006); Missouri, see Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.501-02 (West
2006); Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-116 (2007); Nebraska, see NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-1320.01-03 (2006); New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:2-b
(2007); New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West 2006); New Mexico, see
N.M STAT. ANN. § 24-13A-1 to -5 (West 2007); North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-288.4 (West 2006); North Dakota, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31- 01.1
(2007); Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006); Oklahoma, see OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1380 (West 2006); Pennsylvania, see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7517 (West 2006); Rhode Island, see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-11-1 (2007); South Carolina,
see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525 (2006); South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-
13-17 to -20 (2006); Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-317, 46-1-313 (West
2006); Texas, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.055, 42.04 (Vernon 2006); Utah, see
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-108 (2007); Vermont, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771
(2007); Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (West 2006); Washington, see WASH
REv. CODE ANN. § 68.56.010 (West 2007); Wisconsin, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.011
(West 2007); and Wyoming, see Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-105 (2007).
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across the country hurried to pass legislation to prohibit picketing at
funerals.' 3 Even the United States Congress has passed legislation that
prohibits protests at national cemeteries 14 and that outlaws all protests at
military funerals.' 5 Similar local ordinances prohibiting funeral protests
have also been passed 16 or are being considered. 17 While these statutes
vary in terms of when and where protesting activities are prohibited, they
were all passed with one objective in mind: stopping the Westboro
Baptist Church. 18
13. See L. 99-37, 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2006) (funeral protest law passed with emergency
clause); H.D. 77-2930, Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006) (similar); see also Sam Baker, Statutes
Answer Funeral Protests: But Phelps Family's Legal Response Brings First Amendment
Rights Into the Court Test, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 1, 2006, at Al ("It's hard to recall, at
least in modem First Amendment history, an example where a small group has had such a
big impact on law." (quoting Ronald Collins of the First Amendment Center))
[hereinafter Baker, Statutes Answer Funeral Protests]; Ronald K.L. Collins & David L.
Hudson, Jr., A Funeral for Free Speech?: Laws Against Funeral Protests Strike at the
First Amendment, 29 LEGAL TIMES 16, at 66 (noting there has been a "rush to enact
federal and state laws to ban [funeral protests]"). Additionally, at least one Native
American Tribe has passed a resolution banning protests at military funerals. See James
MacPherson, Tribe Prohibits Funeral Protest on Land, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/
2006/dec/03/tribe-prohibitsjfuneral-protestjland/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
14. See Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 109-228 (2006).
15. See Respect for the Funerals of Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 109-464 (2006).
The legislation expands the Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act by prohibiting
protests at funerals of veterans at non-federally controlled cemeteries. Id. Both houses of
Congress have also passed resolutions regarding funeral protests. See S. Res. 535, 109th
Cong. (2006) (resolution commending the Patriot Guard Riders for shielding mourning
military families from protesters and preserving the memory of fallen service members at
funerals) (passed unanimously in the Senate on July 20, 2006); H.R. Res. 731, 109th
Cong. (2006) (same) (passed by House 418-0 on June 20, 2006).
16. See FirstAmendmentCenter.org, News: Missouri City Passes Law Banning
Funeral Protests, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16220 (last visited
Jan. 14, 2007) (discussing ordinance passed by St. Joseph, Missouri City Council). One
county has even required protestors to hold demonstrations at the county sanitation
department located on the very edge of town. See FirstAmendmentCenter.org: News:
Tennessee County Bars Protests Near Funerals, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
news.aspx?id=15985&SearchString=claycounty (last visited Sept. 28, 2006) [hereinafter
County Bars Protests] (discussing the Clay County resolution, which prohibited
demonstrating within 5,000 feet of a funeral service and required protests to be conducted
in an approved area).
17. See Boyles, Ordinance Targets Protests, supra note 2, at B4 (reporting that
Fresno city council requested city attorney to draft ordinance to prohibit protests at
funerals).
18. See H.R. 94-102, Reg. Sess. (II1. 2006) (Illinois "Let them Rest in Peace Act" is
necessary since "the last thing a family needs to worry about when their sons and
daughters pay the ultimate sacrifice is ... a hate group protesting their loved one's
funeral." (statement of Representative Phelps)); S. 94-97, Reg. Sess. (I11. 2006)
("[T]here's a particular individual who has this desire to ... demonstrate at these funerals
that's the cause of this legislation. And in the states that have banned this ... he has gone
to another state. So, it's actually worked for the purposes for which it was ... passed."
(statement of Senator Cullerton)); S. 94-97, Reg. Sess. (II. 2006) ("Obviously, the intent
of this legislation is to keep the group from Kansas far away from Illinois." (statement of
2007]
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In addition to statutory attempts to stop WBC protests, at least one
citizen group has been formed in an effort to prevent members of the
WBC from disrupting military funerals.' 9 Members of a group known as
the "Patriot Guard" have started riding their motorcycles across the
country to "[s]hield the mourning family and friends [at military
funerals] from interruptions created by any protestor or group of
protestors.,20  According to the Patriot Guard, its members attend
funerals only upon invitation of the fallen soldiers' families and they use
peaceful means to obstruct WBC members' view of the funerals."
While the WBC's protesting activities have incited a heated
debate,22 the statutes passed in response to the WBC are almost as
controversial.23 Many people believe that the families of fallen soldiers
should be able to mourn in peace.24 Others question the constitutionality
of state statutes banning funeral protests. 25 Opponents of the laws, while
not necessarily agreeing with the WBC's activities, believe that the
statutes place undue restrictions on protestors' freedom of speech.26
Thus far, there have been no Supreme Court rulings on the
constitutionality of these funeral protest statutes, however, at least three
Senator Wilhelmi)); H.R. 116-167, Reg. Sess., (S.C. 2006) ("This bill appears to be
driven by news reports about the misguided actions of Reverend Fred Phelps and his
Topeka, Kansas church group at military funerals." (veto statement of Governor
Sanford)); H.D. 77-2930, Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006) ("This bill was proposed in response
to the offensive demonstrations by fanatical and misguided people at the funerals of the
West Virginia coal miners who recently lost their lives in tragic mining accidents."
(statement of Representative Trump)); see also Phelps v. Hamilton, No. 934148SAC,
1994 WL 377071, *1 (D. Kan. 1994) ("The Kansas Funeral Picketing Act was passed in
response to the funeral picketing activities of the Westboro Baptist Church .... );
Legislators Propose Bills, supra note 7; Marc Levy, Rendell Gets Bill Limiting Funeral
Protests, INTELLIGENCER, June 23, 2006, at B4 ("At least 23 ... states have enacted laws
limiting demonstrations at funerals in reaction to the [WBC].").
19. See Patriot Guard Riders, Our History, http://www.patriotguard.org/AboutUs/
OurHistory/tabid/145/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 14 2006).
20. Riders, Home, supra note 9; see also H.R. 6038, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan.
2006) ("The mission of [the Patriot Guard Riders] is to... shield mourning family
members and friends of the deceased service member from interruptions by protesters
protesting or picketing in a manner to communicate a message of hatred or intolerance at
the funeral service.").
21. See Riders, Home, supra note 9.
22. See Legislators Propose Bills, supra note 7; see also County Bars Protests, supra
note 16.
23. See Baker, Statutes Answer Funeral Protests, supra note 13, at Al.
24. See Legislators Propose Bills, supra note 7.
25. See Hate Groups, supra note 4.
26. Id.; see also Legislators Propose Bills, supra note 7 ("In human terms, [the
sponsor of the anti-picketing statute is] trying to do something noble here, but I'm afraid
our Constitution won't allow it." (quoting Gary Allison, Professor of Constitutional Law
at the University of Tulsa)).
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federal courts have addressed the issue27 and other challenges are
pending resolution.28
This comment will analyze whether Pennsylvania's statute
prohibiting picketing at funerals 29 is constitutional under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 30  Focusing on Pennsylvania's
statute will be instructive because it is similar to several other states'
statutes on the subject. 31  Analysis will focus solely on whether the
statute is a valid time, place, and manner restriction. Part II will provide
background information on both the WBC and the legislation the group
has inspired. Part II-A will examine the activities of the WBC that have
motivated state legislatures across the country to pass funeral-protesting
bans. 32 Next, Part IL-B will discuss various aspects of Pennsylvania's
funeral protest statute. Part LI-B-1 will lay out the provisions of the
statute while Part II-B-2 will focus on the statute's legislative history
including the need for and purpose of the legislation as well as relevant
proposed amendments.
Part III will consist of an in-depth analysis of the First Amendment
implications of Pennsylvania's statute prohibiting protests at funerals.
Specifically, Part IL-A will discuss the significance of section 7517's
prohibition on speech within traditional public fora. Part 111-B will
analyze whether the statute is a valid time, place, and manner
restriction. 33  Part III-B-I will discuss whether the statute is content-
neutral. Next, Part III-B-2 will focus on whether the statute is narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest. Part III-B-3 will
27. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006); Phelps-Roper
v. Taft, No. 1:06 Civ. 2038, 2007 WL 915109 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Phelps-Roper v. Nixon,
No. 06-4156 Civ. C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437 (W.D. Mo. 2007).
28. See Phelps-Roper v. Humphreys, No. 06 Civ. 00130, (E.D. Mo. 2006).
29. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006).
30. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952); see also Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980).
31. See infra note 76.
32. Although at least one member of the WBC has asserted that she conducts
protests according to her "firmly and sincerely held religious beliefs" and that "it is
imperative to [her] faith that the contradictory message from public figures be balanced
with scriptural message at the time it is being uttered," Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 9, 16, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06 Civ. 04156 (W.D. Mo. July
21, 2006), the fact that the WBC is a church will not be discussed in any portion of the
analysis. It is worth noting however, that the Supreme Court has held that "religious
organizations [do not] enjoy rights to communicate.., superior to those of other
organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselytize."
Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981).
33. This comment will not address other potential problems with the statute such as
overbreadth and vagueness even though challenges will also likely be made on these
grounds. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 978 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
(challenging Kentucky statute on several constitutional grounds).
2007]
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address whether the statute leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication. Finally, Part IV will set forth a conclusion and
summarize why the statute will likely be held unconstitutional.
II. Background
A. Activities and Beliefs of the WBC
As mentioned above, the passage of many state laws prohibiting
protests at funerals can be largely attributed to the activities of members
of the WBC.34 Accordingly, a brief discussion of the church and its
beliefs seems warranted. Fred Phelps, a former civil rights attorney,
founded the WBC in 1955.35 Phelps is the pastor of the relatively small
congregation, which is reported to consist of roughly seventy-five 36 to
one hundred and fifty members. 37  The WBC practices "Five-Point
Calvinism," a primitive form of the Baptist religion, and preaches
"against all form[s] of sin (e.g., fornication, adultery, sodomy). 38
Although the church claims to preach against all forms of sin, its protests
tend to focus on homosexuality.39 Members of the church adamantly
oppose homosexuality and believe that Americans are "support[ing] filth,
sin and disobedience" by accepting homosexuals.4 °
While the WBC has existed for over fifty years, its members did not
34. See H.R. 94-102, Reg. Sess. (Itl. 2006); S. 94-97, Reg. Sess. (I11. 2006); H.R.
116-167, Reg. Sess., (S.C. 2006); H.D. 77-2930, Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006).
35. About WBC, supra note 3.
36. Mike Wereschagin, PA Bill Targets Funeral Protest, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV.,
Mar. 14, 2006, at A6.
37. Sky News, Inside The Church Of Hate, http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/
0,,91136-120031 1,00.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). According to an Associated Press
article, the church consists "mostly of Phelps' children, grandchildren and in-laws."
Legislators Propose Bills, supra note 7.
38. About WBC, supra note 3.
39. See Westboro Baptist Church FAQ: Focus, http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/
faq.html#Focus (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) [hereinafter WBC FAQ: Focus]. The sins of
fornication and adultery seem to be largely ignored. Id. According to the church's
website, homosexuality deserves "special attention" for several reasons. Id. Namely,
because homosexuality is the sin responsible for the moral crisis in the United States, the
Apostle Paul paid special attention to the sin of homosexuality, and because God
destroyed Sodom where homosexual conditions were present. Id. On its website, WBC
even compares homosexuality to criminal acts such as murder, rape, and embezzlement.
Id.
40. The Westboro Baptist Church, Writings: Legislation Message,
http://www.godhatesfags.com/writings/20051212-legislation-message.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2006) [hereinafter WBC: Legislation]. According to the WBC, "God does not
hate them because they are homosexuals; they are homosexuals because God hates
them." WBC FAQ: Focus, supra note 39.
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begin protesting at funerals until 1991.41 Since that time, the church has
engaged in over 32,000 protests in at least twenty-two states and in
several foreign countries including Iraq, Canada, and Jordan.42 Initially,
the group demonstrated at gay pride parades and the funerals of
homosexual men to spread its message against homosexuality.4 3 It was
not until recently that the group began protesting at the funerals of
soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. 4
According to the WBC, the purpose of its protests is to "oppos[e]
the homosexual lifestyle of soul-damning, nation-destroying filth.",
45
The group claims to use its protests to teach Americans that it is not "OK
to be gay"46 and that anyone who says otherwise is a "fag-enabler.,
4 7
Members of the church believe that the statement "God hates fags" is one
that "the world needs to hear more than it needs oxygen, water and
bread. 4 8  The church "believes [its] message [is the] world's last
hope."49
The WBC has a few rationales for using funerals as occasions for
protests. 50 First, members of the WBC believe it is their duty to warn the
rest of the country of its sins. 51  Because people at funerals "have
thoughts of mortality, heaven, hell, eternity, etc., on their minds ... [i]t's
the perfect time to warn them of things to come. '52 Second, according to
the WBC, Jesus did not approve of mourning the dead.53 The WBC
41. See About WBC, supra note 3.
42. Id.; Anti-Defamation League, Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church: In
Their Own Words, http://www.adl.org/special-reports/wbc/default.asp (last visited Jan.
14, 2007). At least 200 of the protests have been held at the funerals of soldiers killed in
Iraq and Afghanistan. About WBC, supra note 3.
43. See About WBC, supra note 3.
44. See Boyles, Ordinance Targets Protests, supra note 2, at B4. The church has
also recently engaged in and threatened to engage in protests at other high-profile
funerals including the funerals of the victims of the Amish school shootings, the workers
who died trapped in mines in West Virginia, and the victims of the Minneapolis bridge
collapse. See Barbara Hollingsworth, Trade is Phelps Sign of Times, TOPEKA CAPITAL J.,
Oct. 5, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Hollingsworth, Trade is Phelps Sign of Times]; WESTBORO
BAPTIST CHURCH, THANK GOD FOR MINNEAPOLIS BRIDGE COLLAPSE (2007),
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/aug2007/20070802-minneapolis-bridge-
collapse.pdf.
45. About WBC, supra note 3.
46. Purpose of .Westboro Baptist Church, http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/
purpose.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Purpose of WBC].
47. WBC: Legislation, supra note 40.
48. Purpose of WBC, supra note 46.
49. About WBC, supra note 3.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Westboro Baptist Church FAQ: Funeral, http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/
faq.html#Funeral (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) [hereinafter WBC FAQ: Funeral].
53. See id. (referring to occasion where Jesus ordered a son not to attend his father's
funeral and mourn, but instead to "preach the kingdom of God").
2007]
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believes that Americans live in derogation of this biblical command
because Americans "worship the dead" and "turn[] [dead homosexuals]
into heroes. '5 4 Third, the WBC protests at funerals because it provides
the church a sounding board that it would otherwise lack.55 The WBC
claims that it only protests at funerals that are being used as public
forums to promote sin or are "held as grand public affairs. 56 Because
"the media, military and families of these dead soldiers [are] using the
deaths of these young men and women to promote their agendas, and
impose upon the American people at large their God-less views about the
war and the deaths of these soldiers," the WBC attends the funerals to
spread its "counter-message" to the sin it believes is being promoted.
5 7
For this reason, the WBC does not protest at private funerals that are not
covered by the media.58 Additionally, if the church is provided media
access it will use that forum to spread its message rather than protesting
at a funeral.59
The WBC focuses on military funerals in particular for several
reasons. 60 First, the church believes that the U.S. military's practice of
admitting homosexuals into the armed services is one of the reasons the
United States is doomed.6' Second, the church does not consider soldiers
heroes; rather, it maintains that soldiers are lazy "turkeys" who are not
"qualified for honest work., 62 Third, the WBC protests soldiers' funerals
because the soldiers knowingly joined a "fag-infested" U.S. military,
which is fighting against God because God is "America's [t]errorist.
', 63
54. WBC: Legislation, supra note 40.
55. See id. For this reason, the church has recently expanded its protest activities to
include other high profile funerals. See Hollingsworth, Trade is Phelps Sign of Times,
supra note 44, at 1.
56. WBC: Legislation, supra note 40.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. In fact, in October 2006 the church agreed to refrain from protesting at the
funerals of a group of Amish girls who were killed in a school shooting in exchange for
one hour of media time on radio host Mike Gallagher's radio talk show. See
Hollingsworth, Trade is Phelps Sign of Times, supra note 44, at 1. Last April, Gallagher
gave the WBC radio time again in exchange for the group canceling the protests it had
planned for the funerals of the Virginia Tech shooting victims. Mike Gallagher,
Protecting Decency, http://www.townhall.com/columnists/MikeGallagher/2007/04/22/
protecting-decency (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
60. See Westboro Baptist Church FAQ: Soldier, http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/
faq.html#Soldier_.Funeral (last visited Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter WBC FAQ: Soldier].
61. See WBC FAQ: Who, supra note 1; WBC: Legislation, supra note 40; see also
Christina Gostomski, Rendell Signs Bill Prohibiting Protests at Funerals: Measure was
Response to Activity by Kansas Church Group, MORNING CALL, July 1, 2006, at A10
[hereinafter Gostomski, Rendell Signs Bill].
62. WBC FAQ: Soldier, supra note 60.
63. Id.; see also Kathleen Haughney, Rendell Signs Law Prohibiting Groups
Protesting At Funerals, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 1, 2006, at B5 [hereinafter
[Vol. 112:2
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Fourth, the WBC maintains that it is wrong for the soldiers' parents to
teach their children that "it's OK to be gay., 64 It is for these reasons that
the WBC protests at soldiers' funerals regardless of the soldiers'
sexuality.65
WBC protests are typically conducted on public property at, what
the church members consider, a "respectful distance" from the memorial
66ceremony. Protestors gather on sidewalks and carry signs displaying
messages such as "GOD HATES FAGS," "FAGS DOOM NATIONS,"
"THANK GOD FOR AIDS," "GOD BLEW UP THE SOLDIER,"
"THANK GOD FOR DEAD SOLDIERS," and "AIDS CURES
FAGS. 67 The church claims to derive these messages from the Bible.68
In addition to its picketing campaign, the WBC maintains several
websites to help spread its "gospel., 69 The websites contain schedules of
upcoming protest events, pod casts, video newscasts, press releases,
memorials, and photographs. 70  Recent widespread media attention has
also given the church an additional sounding board. 1 It is the group's
protest activities, however, that have disturbed state legislatures across
the country.
B. Section 7517
1. Provisions of Section 7517
State statutes prohibiting funeral protests vary in several ways.
Broad distinctions between state funeral protest statutes can be made on
Haughney, Rendell Signs Law] ("[WBC] charges that deaths of American service
personnel are a punishment from God for homosexuality in America.").
64. WBC: Legislation, supra note 40.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. About WBC, supra note 3.
68. See id.
69. The websites maintained by the WBC include: Westboro Baptist Church, God
Hates Fags, http://www.godhatesfags.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2007); Westboro Baptist
Church, The Sign of the Times, http://www.thesignsofthetimes.net/ (last visited Sept. 7,
2007); Westboro Baptist Church, God Hates America, http://www.godhatesamerica.com/,
(last visited Sept. 7, 2007); Westboro Baptist Church, Priests Rape Boys,
http://www.priestsrapeboys.com/, (last visited Sept. 7, 2007); Westboro Baptist Church,
God Hates Sweden, http://www.godhatessweden.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2007);
Westboro Baptist Church, God Hates Canada, http://www.godhatescanada.com/ (last
visited Sept. 7, 2007); Westboro Baptist Church, Smell the Brimstone,
http://www.smellthebrimstone.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
70. See The Westboro Baptist Church Home Page, http://www.godhatesfags.com/
main/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
71. See Hollingsworth, Trade is Phelps Sign of Times, supra note 44, at 1. For
example, Shirley Phelps-Roper, Fred Phelps' daughter and active member of the WBC,
has recently made numerous appearances on various radio and television shows. Id.
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72 73 1 74 7e5tat least four grounds: time, distance, intent, and punishment.
72. Most statutes prohibit protest activities one hour before, during, and one hour
after any funeral or memorial service. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2006); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West 2006); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 578.501-02 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West 2006); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006)
(earlier effective date); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006) (later effective
date); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1380 (West 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517
(West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-13-17 & 22-13-19 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 42.055, 42.04 (Vernon 2006). Some states prohibit protests thirty minutes
before, during, and thirty minutes after a funeral. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (West
2006). Other statutes are simply variations on this theme. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-17
(2006) (prohibiting protests one hour before a funeral, during a funeral, and immediately
following a funeral); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-125 (2006) (prohibiting protests "at"
funerals); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (2006) (same); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. Law,
§ 10-205 (West 2006) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 42A (West 2006)
(same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d (West 2006) (same); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-17-317 & 46-2-105 (West 2006) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (West 2006)
(same).
73. Typically, the no-protest buffer zones are 500 feet wide. See ALA. CODE § 13A-
11-17 (2006); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
272 § 42A (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d (West 2006); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.501 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21 § 1380 (West 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (West 2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon 2006).
Some states only impose a 100-foot buffer zone, while others set a broad 1,000-foot zone.
Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-125 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. Law, § 10-205
(West 2006) with Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
13-19 (2006). Other states' buffer zones fall somewhere within this range. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (West 2006) (150-foot zone); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.502 (West
2006) (300-foot zone); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.02 (2006) (300-foot zone); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4 (West 2006) (300-foot zone for displaying visual images); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006) (later effective date) (300-foot zone). Still,
some state statutes do not establish a buffer zone, and only generally prohibit protesting
at funerals. See Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (2006); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 578.501 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006) (earlier effective
date); TENN. CODE ANN. § 46-2-105 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (West
2006).
74. Several states require a person to intentionally engage in protests or activities
that interfere with funerals to violate the state statute. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-17
(2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-125 (2006);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (2006);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West 2006);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4 (West
2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 46-2-105 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (West
2006). Other state statutes prohibit all protest activities regardless of intent. See MD,
CODE ANN., CRIM. Law, § 10-205 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 42A
(West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 578.501-02 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.03 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006) (earlier effective date); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30
(West 2006) (later effective date); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1380 (West 2006); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-13-17 (2006); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (West 2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon 2006).
75. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-17 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2006);
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Section 7517, Pennsylvania's statute prohibiting funeral protests,
provides a fairly representative example of several other states' statutes
on the subject.7 6 First, it prohibits protests one hour before, during, and
one hour after commemorative services. 77 Second, it creates a 500-foot
buffer zone between protesters and funeral ceremonies. 78  Third, it
prohibits all protesting, not just intentional protests. 79 Finally, it makes
violation of the statute a criminal offense. 80
Pennsylvania's funeral protest law prohibits engaging "in
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 42A (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.167d (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:33-8.1 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1380 (West 2006); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (West 2006); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon 2006). Most statutes make violations a
misdemeanor. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-
125 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (2006);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. Law, § 10-205 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272
§ 42A (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501-02 (West 2006); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-35-18 (West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.501-02 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-1320.03 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-288.4 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.99 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21 § 1380 (West 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-13-17 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (West 2006); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (West 2006).
Only a few statutes make violations felonies. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d
(West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 46-2-105 (West 2006). Other statutes make first-time
violations misdemeanors and subsequent violations felonies. See ALA. CODE § 13A- 11-
17 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4 (West 2006). Some statutes also provide
for civil liability. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-126 (2006); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.501 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8320 (2006).
76. Pennsylvania's statute shares at least one of the four characteristics mentioned
above with at least sixteen other states. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-17 (2006); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. Law, § 10-205 (West 2006); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 42A (West 2006); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d
(West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West 2006); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18
(West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.502 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.02
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1' (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4
(West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§ 1380 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-13-19 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
17-317; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon 2006).
77. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 7517(b). Apparently, amendments to the bill that would have imposed
harsher sanctions were not introduced in the Senate because legislators were attempting
to craft a bill that was "standardized across the United States so there will be a
consistency in the States that try to address this issue." S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
Despite legislators' efforts, however, state statutes addressing this issue are far from
uniform. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-125 (2006), with MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
Law, § 10-205 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-13-19 (2006).
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demonstration activities within 500 feet of any cemetery, mortuary,
church or other location being utilized for the purposes of a
commemorative service within one hour prior to, during and one hour
following the commemorative service.' ' 1  Commemorative service is
defined as "[a]n event involving the gathering of individuals who
assemble" for the purpose of mourning the deceased person or paying
respect to the deceased person's family.82  To be considered a
commemorative service, the event must be (1) held "[a]t a cemetery or
other location during the burial, funeral, ceremony or memorial service
of a specific deceased person;" (2) held "[i]n a building during the
viewing, visitation, burial, funeral, ceremony or memorial service of a
specific deceased person;" or (3) "a procession to a cemetery, building or
other location in which a viewing, visitation, burial, funeral, ceremony or
memorial service of a specific deceased person. 83
A wide range of conduct falls within the statute's definition of
"demonstration activities." 84 Demonstration activities, as defined by the
statute, include (1) "picketing or similar conduct;" (2) "oration, speech or
use of sound amplification equipment or device or similar conduct that is
not part of a commemorative service;" (3) displaying "any placard, sign,
banner, flag or similar device, unless such display is part of a
commemorative service;" or (4) distributing "any handbill, pamphlet,
leaflet or other written or printed matter, other than a program distributed
as part of a commemorative service.' 85
Violation of the statute is a third-degree misdemeanor and is
punishable by up to one year in prison and a maximum fine of $2,500.86
Additionally, section 8320 permits persons aggrieved by violations of
section 7517 to seek civil remedies from violators.
87
81. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AkN. § 7517(b).




86. Id.; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101 & 1104. The penalty provisions were
characterized by Senator Pippy as "at the high end or more strict end for penalty
enforcement" compared to other states that only impose penalties of six to nine months in
prison. S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
87. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8320 (West 2006). The statute provides for
injunctive relief as well as general and special damages including attorney fees, court
costs, punitive damages and damages for emotional distress. Id. § 8320(b) & (c).
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2. Legislative History of Section 7517
a. Need for the Legislation
Prior to the enactment of the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act in
1992,88 no states had enacted statutes prohibiting protesting or picketing
at funerals.89  In fact, widespread adoption of laws proscribing funeral
protests did not begin until 2006.90 Pennsylvania began considering
legislation to prohibit protests at funerals in 2005.91 It was not until
2006, however, that a bill to prevent funeral protests was introduced in
the Senate.9 2
Pennsylvania's funeral protest legislation received widespread
support by state legislators93 and was largely a bipartisan effort.9 4 Both
88. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (1992). This statute was overturned in Phelps v.
Hamilton. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 840 F. Supp. 1442, 1462 (D. Kan. 1993). The Kansas
state legislature has since passed a revised version of the 1992 Act, which is also referred
to as the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (2005)
(amended Apr. 12, 2007).
89. The fact that funeral anti-picketing laws were not passed on a wide-scale basis
until 2006 raises some interesting questions about the relative importance legislators
place on the people affected by the WBC's activities. Even though the WBC began its
protest crusade back in 1991, widespread legislation was not enacted to prohibit fuieral
protests until the group began picketing at military funerals in 2005. See Boyles,
Ordinance Targets Protests, supra note 2, at B4; see also Tim Hrenchir, Church Files
Records Request, TOPEKA CAPITAL J., Oct. 31, 2006, at 1. Because statutes were not
passed during the 1990's when protests were limited to the funerals of homosexual males,
it appears that legislators were not nearly as concerned with the distress the protests
caused these individuals' family members to suffer as they have been with the impact on
soldiers' families. See Jack Ventimiglia, "Suit-proof' Law to Restrict Funeral Pickets in
Limbo: Parent Wonders Why State Took Twenty Years to Write Law,
http://www.kccommunitynews.com/articles/2007/07/27/overiand-park-sun/news/a-all-
breaking-news-fred.phelps.stopped.txt (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
90. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-17 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (West 2006);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-9-101, 18-9-106 to -108, 13-21-126, 18-9-117, 18-9-125 (2006);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (2006); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. Law, § 10-205 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 42A (West
2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501
(West 2006); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.501-02
(West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.01-03 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1
(West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3767.30 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1380 (West 2006); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 22-13-17 - 20 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-317 & 46-2-105 (West
2006); Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.055, 42.04 (Vernon 2006); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-415 (West 2006).
91. See S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
92. Id.
93. See John L. Micek, Bill Would Allow Families to Grieve in Peace at Funerals:
Gov. Rendell Expected to Sign Law Prohibiting Protesters from Graveside Services,
MORNING CALL, June 23, 2006, at Al0 [hereinafter Micek, Bill Would Allow Families to
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the House and the Senate unanimously approved the legislation, which
Governor Ed Rendell signed into law on June 30, 2006. 95 The law went
into effect on August 29, 2006.96
The legislative history of section 7517 indicates that the legislature
passed the statute to prevent protests by the WBC.97 The legislative
journal includes several statements by legislators condemning the
WBC's protest activities. 98 For instance, Senator Bob Robbins stated
that the legislation was introduced "to address the despicable act of
protesting at our fallen soldiers' funerals" and to "send[] a message to
[the WBC]." 99 Moreover, the legislation was necessary because "[the]
brave men and women who died serving our nation... and their families
deserve nothing less than our full respect."' 00 State legislators have also
made numerous public statements indicating that they intended the law to
prevent the WBC from protesting at funerals.'
Governor Rendell has also attributed Pennsylvania's need for a
funeral protest law to the WBC 10 2 Before signing the bill, Governor
Rendell's office stated that the law's purpose is to "protect[] a family's
private mourning period"'10 3 and allow "families to be able to remember
Grieve in Peace]. Other state statutes prohibiting protests at funerals have also received
widespread support. See H.R. 94-102, Reg. Sess. (Il1. 2006); S. 94-97, Reg. Sess. (I11.
2006); H.R. 93-35, Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2006); H.D. 77-2930, Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006).
94. See S. 190-44, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006). Statutes in other states have also passed
largely without regard to party affiliations. See S. 94-97, Reg. Sess. (I11. 2006); see also
Stan Lee, Editorial, Military Funerals Deserve Every Effort to Protect Them, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 21, 2006, at A8; Michael Sangiacomo, Legislators Go to Court to
Back Rest in Peace Act, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 12, 2006, at B10; John Stamper, Protest
Law Halted: Free-Speech Issues at Funerals Cited, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Sept.
27, 2006, at B1.
95. See H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); see
also Levy, supra note 18, at B4; Micek, Bill Would Allow Families to Grieve in Peace,
supra note 93, at A10.
96. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006).
97. See, e.g., S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
98. See id.
99. Id. Senator Robbins also referred to the WBC's protest messages as "hate-filled
rhetoric." Id.
100. Id. (statement of Senator Robbins); see also H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006)
("[lI]t is a disgrace that people [are using] those freedoms that are being protected as an
excuse for their horrible ... behavior as they have protested at. . . funerals when family
members are trying to mourn ... the loss of their loved ones who have sacrificed the
ultimate sacrifice for their nation." (statement of Representative Metcalfe)).
101. See, e.g., Gostomski, Rendell Signs Bill, supra note 61, at A10.
102. See Levy, supra note 18, at B4.
103. Id. (statement by Rendell's press secretary Kate Philips). Lawmakers from other
states also had the privacy of mourners in mind when enacting their state statutes. See S.
94-97, Reg. Sess. (I11. 2006); S. 94-95, Reg. Sess. (I11. 2006); H.R. 0226, 93rd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 2006); Neb. Governor's Message, Apr. 4, 2206, available at NE Gov.
Mess., 4/4/2006 (Westlaw).
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fallen soldiers with 'honor, dignity and respect. ' ' ' 104  Several news
sources have also attributed the passage of the statute to the WBC's
protest activities.1
0 5
b. Purpose of the Legislation
The purposes of Pennsylvania's funeral picketing statute are
reflected in the statute's legislative history 0 6 and in the text of the statute
itself.10 7  Section 7517 lists several purposes the law was designed to
serve .10 8  The statute's statement of legislative intent reflects the
legislature's desire to protect mourning families' ability to mourn in
privacy while providing ample opportunity for the exercise of free
speech. 10 9 In this regard, the statute aims to protect funeral attendees'
freedoms of religion and assembly under the First Amendment."o The
law also seeks to prevent demonstrations that cause grieving families to
suffer emotional distress and disturbance.' Additionally, prohibiting
protests at funerals ensures that deceased soldiers are properly honored
and preserves the sanctity and importance of funeral ceremonies
themselves."1
2
The legislative history of section 7517 also indicates that the
statute's purpose is to protect the families of fallen soldiers by preventing
the WBC from protesting in Pennsylvania. 13 The sponsor of the bill in
the Senate, Republican Senator John Pippy, stated that the law is
designed to protect deceased veterans' families. 14 According to Pippy,
104. Haughney, Rendell Signs Law, supra note 63, at B5. Other states have also
identified dignity as a chief goal in passing funeral protest legislation. See, e.g., S. 94-97,
Reg. Sess. (Il. 2006) (statement by Senator Winkel) (The "bill . . . protects really a
sacred right that we have, particularly in the case of military funerals, for the family to
grieve and put their loved ones to rest in a dignified manner.").
105. See Gostomski, Rendell Signs Bill, supra note 61, at A10 ("The legislation was
spurred by the Kansas-based Westboro Baptist Church, which has received national
attention for protesting military funerals."); Haughney, Rendell Signs Law, supra note 63,
at B5 ("The legislation developed after members of the Westboro Baptist Church of
Kansas began protesting at military funerals around the country."); Micek, Bill Would
Allow Families to Grieve in Peace, supra note 93, at A10 (similar).
106. See H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
107. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(a) (West 2006).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 7517(a)(4). The statute declares that family members of deceased persons
"have a substantial interest in organizing and attending commemorative services," which
is infringed when individuals engage in funeral protests. Id. § 7517(a)(1).
110. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(a); see also McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F.
Supp. 2d 975, 985 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (discussing Kentucky's funeral protest statute).
111. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(a)(3).
112. Id. § 7517(a).
113. See, e.g., H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
114. See H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); see also Gostomski, Rendell Signs Bill,
supra note 61, at AI0. While debating the bill in the Senate, however, Pippy stated that
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families have a "right to mourn" and "bury their loved ones in peace."
'"15
Additionally, "the right of the families to bury their dead in peace is as
important as [the] right as a citizen to speak."
'" 6
Other senators' concerns echoed those of Senator Pippy. 17 Senator
Regola supported the legislation because "[t]he families and friends of
the men and women who have given their lives to our country deserve
the space and time to grieve for those they have lost."" 8 Moreover, the
"legislation... ensure[s] that our service members will be honored with
the uninterrupted ceremonies they deserve." 1 9  Representative Jeffrey
Pyle favored the law because "no one should have to deal with
grandstanding and putting forth the beliefs that may run counter to what
a lot of us think" when dealing with the death of a loved one. 
2 °
c. Proposed Amendments
Despite their overall support for the law, Pennsylvania legislators
were concerned about possible constitutional problems with a law
prohibiting protests at funerals.' 2' Even Senator Regola, a strong
supporter of the law, acknowledged that the WBC should be allowed
"some space" to engage in protests. 22  Still others, such as Senator
the bill was intended to apply equally to all funeral protests-not just protests at military
funerals. See S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006). According to Pippy, the general
applicability of the law makes it content-neutral. Id. Whether crafting the bill to apply to
all funerals, not just military funerals, has any impact on the content neutrality of the law
will be discussed below.
115. S. 190-44, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); see also H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006)
("[Families] deserve to be able to mourn the loss of [a] loved one in solitude and with
dignity" and are being prevented from doing so "by a bunch of jerks." (statement of
Representative Mann)).
116. S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. Senator Regola also stated that the WBC's protests "send[] a message of
disrespect and insensitivity to our service people." Id.; see also H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 2006) ("[Soldiers] deserve to be laid to rest with dignity." (statement of
Representative Mann)).
120. H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
121. See S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006). Other
states' government officials have also exhibited concern about the constitutionality of
their states' statutes. See H.R. 116-167, Reg. Sess., (S.C. 2006). For example, South
Carolina Governor, Mark Sanford, vetoed a bill that would have banned protests at
funerals because the bill did not do an adequate job of balancing freedom of speech
against the right to attend peaceful funeral services. See H.R. 4965, 117th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007); H.R. 116-167, Reg. Sess., (S.C. 2006). The governor's veto was
overridden in the House by a vote of 105-0 and in the Senate by 44-0. See South
Carolina Legislature, Bill Tracking and Reports: H. 4965, http://www.scstatehouse.net/
(last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
122. See S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
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Pippy, contended that the bill was a valid time, place, and manner
restriction because "disgraceful protests," such as those conducted by the
WBC, were subject to the same penalties as other protests.1
23
Concern regarding the constitutionality of the original bill led to the
proposal of two amendments in the House. 124  Representative Leach
proposed the first amendment, A07704, which was ultimately rejected.
25
Representative Pyle introduced the second amendment, A07709, which
was adopted by the House and the Senate. 1
26
Representative Leach introduced his amendment to resolve what he
perceived to be constitutional problems with the bill. 127 Leach intended
his amendment to prevent "the government [from] get[ting] involved in
what is a good protest and what is not a good protest."' 128  His
amendment would have prohibited protest activities, which were defined
as "[a] congregation, picket, patrol or demonstration that is not part of a
commemorative service."'' 29  This language would have replaced the
original text of the bill, which defined protest activities as (1) "loud and
raucous noise" that caused "unreasonable distress" to funeral attendees;
(2) "abusive epithets, display of visual images that convey fighting
words or any threatening gesture" likely to incite violence; or
(3) "conduct intended to disturb or disrupt a commemorative service."' 3 °
The amendment would have eliminated the family distress
requirement. 131
Leach considered the original text of the bill content-based because
it only prohibited protests that were likely to upset family members of
the deceased and, therefore, would have prohibited some protest
activities while allowing others. 132 The only distinction between legal
and illegal protests would have been the reaction family members had to
the content of the speech. 133 For the same reason, the House Judiciary
Committee determined that the original text of the bill was content-
123. S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); see also H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
Legislators from other states also aggressively assert that their state statutes are content-
neutral. See, e.g., S. 94-97, Reg. Sess. (I11. 2006) ("This is constitutional. It is not
content-based. It is a reasonable time, place and manner regulation of speech, and we
believe ... strongly that any court in America will uphold this law." (statement of
Senator Wilhelmi)).
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based. 3 4 Leach argued that the distress requirement was unnecessary to
accomplish the legislative purpose because an absolute ban on all funeral
protests would just as easily prevent Phelps' group from protesting at
funerals and would be more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny
than a partial ban.135 He also argued that the family distress requirement
would pose several difficulties regarding enforcement. 136  In the end,
Leach's amendment was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of 178-24.137
After opposing Representative Leach's amendment, Representative
Pyle introduced amendment A07709 to bring the funeral protest bill "into
line" with the Federal Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act. 138 The
amendment replaced the word "protest" with the word
"demonstration" 139 and expanded the prohibition on protests to include
not only burials, but also other funeral services and ceremonies.
140
Additionally, the amendment eliminated the provision that would have
prohibited "raucous noise" that causes distress, signs conveying fighting
words, threats likely to (Provoke violence, and conduct intended to disrupt
the service for the current bill language.' 4' Pyle's proposed amendment
faired better than Leach's proposal and was ultimately adopted. 1
42
The amended bill passed unanimously in the House 202-0.143 The
bill was then sent to the Senate for consideration of the Pyle
amendment. 144 The Senate passed the bill with the amendment on June
30, 2006 and Governor Rendell signed the bill into law the same day.
145
III. Analysis of Section 7517's First Amendment Implications
Section 7517's regulation of speech is likely unconstitutional under
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The First
Amendment prohibits Congress from passing any law that "abridg[es]
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006). For example, questions would arise
regarding how many family members must be distressed for a violation to occur and what




139. After his amendment was rejected, Representative Leach supported Pyle's
amendment because he believed substituting the word "protest" with the word
"demonstration" made the bill more content-neutral. Id. Leach disagreed with other
portions of the amendment, however, because he thought the legality of a protest would
still turn on the effect the speech had on families. Id.





145. See S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
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the freedom of speech." 146  Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment and
prohibits states from passing laws that infringe on freedom of speech.
47
Despite the seemingly absolute prohibition against laws abridging
freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First
Amendment to permit the regulation of speech under certain
circumstances. The remainder of this comment will analyze whether
section 7517 is a permissible regulation of speech.
A. Section 7517's Prohibition of Speech Within Traditional Public
Fora
Analysis of a speech regulation regarding location focuses on the
nature of the forum used to communicate speech. 148 The standard used
to evaluate place restrictions turns on the character of the property a
speaker uses to communicate his message. 149  For instance, public
sidewalks and streets are considered traditional public fora that are held
in trust for public use.' 50  Accordingly, the government cannot
completely prohibit speech on public streets and sidewalks. 5 ' The
government does, however, have the power to control the property it
owns and ensure that it is used for its designated purpose.
52
Pennsylvania's statute prohibiting demonstrations at
commemorative services prevents all protests within 500 feet of a funeral
146. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
147. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952); see also Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980).
148. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988).
149. Id. The Court has identified three categories of fora: "the traditional public
forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum."
Id. at 479-80.
150. Id. at 480; see also Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 813 (1984); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980) (noting that public
streets, sidewalks, and parks have such deep historical roots as fora for speech that access
to the areas to disseminate speech cannot be constitutionally denied); Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) (use of "streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar
public places ... for the purpose of exercising (First Amendment rights) cannot
constitutionally be denied broadly...") (internal citations omitted); Hague v. Comm. for
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.). The Court has noted
that public streets and sidewalks do not lose their designation as public fora just because
they are located in residential neighborhoods. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 480.
151. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481. Demonstrations that turn violent, however, lose
First Amendment protection. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116, 118 (concluding expressive
activity on sidewalks adjacent to public schools could not be prohibited unless it
"materially disrupts" classroom activities, violates the rights of others, or causes
"substantial disorder").
152. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648
n.10 (1981).
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or similar ceremony. 153  The prohibition includes protests and
demonstrations on traditional public fora such as sidewalks as well as
those conducted on private property. 154 This comment will focus solely
on the constitutionality of the statute as applied to protected speech in
traditional public fora.
155
B. Section 7517 as a Time, Place, and Manner Restriction
The Court has developed a framework to analyze whether a statute
prohibiting speech in a traditional public forum violates the First
Amendment. 156 Under this framework, speech does not enjoy absolute
protection from state regulation, but rather, is subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions. 157 State restrictions on freedom of speech
are constitutional if "they are justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech,.... they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and.., they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information."' 58  Statutes that pass
this test are valid, even if they directly limit expression. 59
Pennsylvania's statute prohibiting protests at funerals is certainly a
statute that abridges protestors' freedom of speech since it completely
153. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b) (West 2006).
154. Id.
155. Focus is limited to the statute's prohibition on protected speech in traditional
public fora because the WBC conducts most of its protests on public sidewalks. If the
WBC conducted its protests inside churches or cemeteries, however, the analysis would
be different because the demonstrations would likely be considered incompatible with the
normal use of such locations and the state's interest in regulating the speech would
increase. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Although some may
argue that the WBC's protests are not protected speech, this argument would likely fail
because the group's speech does not amount to fighting words or obscenity. The protests
are not fighting words because they are not directed at any specific individual. The
speech is not obscene because it does not appeal to a prurient interest. Even if the
WBC's words were unprotected, the statute does not limit its prohibition to unprotected
speech; rather, it prohibits all speech regardless of whether the speech is constitutionally
protected.
156. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
157. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Heffron
v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470 n.17 (1980); Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 545 n.2 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." (citing Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)); Police Dep't ofChi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972).
158. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 736 (2000)
(Souter, J., concurring); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186, 189 (1997);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481;
Madsen v. Women's Health.Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994); Members of City
Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984); Heffron, 452 U.S. at
649; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
159. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 299 n.8.
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prohibits speech under certain circumstances.' 60  Because the First
Amendment has been incorporated to apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment,1 61 Pennsylvania's statute must comply with
constitutional standards. 162 Specifically, section 7517 must be content-
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open alternative channels of communication.' 63 Alternatively, if
the statute is content-based, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. 1
64
1. Content Neutrality
The basis for valid time, place, and manner regulations cannot be
the content of the speech. 165  Under the First Amendment, the
government cannot restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.' 66  Indeed, statutes cannot punish
someone solely for expressing unpopular views 167 or for actions that
require subjective determinations regarding the nature of the speech or
conduct.
68
A law is content-neutral if it can be justified on grounds unrelated to
the content of the prohibited speech. 169  As long as a law does not
reference any specific idea, it generally remains content-neutral, even if
it creates benefits or burdens on speech. 70 Statutes that have incidental
160. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006).
161. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952); see also Consol.
Edison, 447 U.S. at 534.
162. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 703.
163. See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
164. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).
165. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536; see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981). In other words the "operative distinction"
between legal and illegal conduct cannot be the message on the picket sign. Police Dep't
of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). To allow otherwise would inhibit political,
cultural, and individual growth. See id. at 95-96.
166. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 537; id. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring); Mosley,
408 U.S. at 95.
167. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965); see also Grayned v. Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 113 (1972).
168. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (statute prohibiting annoying
behavior was invalid since enforcement turned on police officer's subjective
determination of what was "annoying"); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 113.
169. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000); Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988). The requirement of
content neutrality reflects the belief that every point of view should have "an equal
opportunity to be heard." Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. Additionally, the Court has noted that
content-neutral restrictions do not pose the same dangers to free speech as content-based
restrictions. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997).
170. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). For this reason,
restrictions on the place in which speech is conveyed do not become content-based even
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effects on speech are not content-based as long as the statute "serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression." '71 This rule remains the
same even if the law affects only some speakers or communications and
not others.1 72 Laws of general applicability are also typically content-
neutral. 
1 73
On the other hand, a law is generally content-based if, on its face, it
favors or disfavors a certain type of speech because of the views or
beliefs the speech expresses.174 The main consideration in determining
whether a statute is content-based is "whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message
it conveys."'' 75  Under this test, the primary factor to consider is the
government's purpose for passing the legislation. 76 Considerations used
if they are passed in response to certain groups. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 724 ("[A]
statute prohibiting solicitation in airports that was motivated by the aggressive
approaches of Hare Krishnas does not become content-based solely because its
application is confined to airports.").
171. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. Even content-neutral restrictions may burden only
certain types of speech. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
314 n.14 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For example, a restriction banning only
inexpensive forms of speech will mostly burden the messages of poor speakers. Id.
172. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
173. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981) (rule that applied equally to all individuals seeking to distribute and sell written
materials was content-neutral). Other examples of content-neutral prohibitions include
bans on camping and posting flyers on public property. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 295;
Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984).
174. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 724; Turner, 512 U.S. at 643; see also Boos, 485 U.S. at
321 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (concluding statute prohibiting the use of picket signs in
front of embassies was content-based because it was designed to prohibit the "potential
primary impact" of speech because the only interest the government asserted was
protecting the dignity of foreign dignitaries from messages critical of their respective
governments); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1980) (holding statute prohibiting
all residential picketing except peaceful labor picketing was content-based because lawful
conduct could only be determined by referencing the content of the speaker's message);
Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (holding city ordinance allowing
only peaceful labor protests and prohibiting all other peaceful protests was
unconstitutional).
175. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000); Turner, 512 U.S. at 642; Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at
804.
176. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753, 763 (1994). But cf Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 794
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[lillicit legislative intent is
not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment." (citing Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991)); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A]ny restriction on
speech, the application of which turns on the content of the speech, is a content-based
restriction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it. That... has always been
implicit in the fact that we term the test a 'content-based' test rather than a 'motivation-
based' test."). The Court has noted, however, "while a content-based purpose may be
sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not
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to determine the government's purpose include justifications found in the
legislative record and statements of purpose in the preamble or
substantive provisions of the statute itself.177  Other relevant factors
include whether the statute was designed to limit specific ideas, whether
the statute was applied to a certain person or group of people because of
the ideas they were communicating, and whether the text of the statute is
discriminatory. 178  Additionally, laws that are susceptible to arbitrary
enforcement by government officials are not typically content-neutral.
179
It is important to note, however, that the fact that a statute or ordinance
was supported or endorsed by proponents on one side of a debate does
not make it content-based.18°
Some laws have both content-neutral and content-based features.
181
In cases where laws have both content-based and content-neutral aspects,
the inquiry focuses on whether the statute is predominately content-
based.1 82 When a statute applies equally to all speakers without reference
to the their message and is justified by content-neutral considerations, the
statute is predominately content-neutral.
183
Several considerations support the conclusion that Pennsylvania's
funeral protest statute is content-neutral. 184 To begin with, the statute can
be justified on grounds unrelated to the content of the speech. 185 The text
of the statute supports the conclusion that the legislature was concerned
with the effects of all picketing activities at commemorative services-
not just picketing against homosexuality or pickets by the WBC. 186 On
its face, section 7517 does not seek to prohibit the conveyance of any
specific idea; rather, it prohibits all protests at funerals regardless of the
content of the speech. 187  Accordingly, the text of the statute is not
necessary to such a showing in all cases." Turner, 512 U.S. at 642. Conversely, the mere
assertion of a content-neutral purpose is not enough to save a law, which, on its face,
discriminates based on content. See id. at 642-43.
177. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 983 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
178. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984).
179. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981) (concluding rule that required allocating space on first come, first serve basis was
not susceptible to arbitrary discretion because it did not raise concerns of suppressing
particular points of view).
180. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 724.
181. See McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
182. Id.
183. Id. (concluding Kentucky funeral protest statute that was justified by content-
neutral and content-based considerations was predominately content-neutral).
184. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
185. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006).
186. Id. § 7517(a) & (c).
187. Id. § 7517(b).
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discriminatory. 188 The fact that persons who disagree with the messages
and practices of the WBC endorsed Pennsylvania's funeral protest statute
does not make the statute content-based.
189
Additionally, section 7517 is likely content-neutral because it is a
law of general applicability.'9" The fact that the statute prohibits
protesting at all funerals-not just military funerals-supports a finding
of content neutrality. 191 Moreover, the law does not provide exceptions
for certain types of speech within 500 feet of a commemorative
service. 192 It prohibits picketing against homosexuality as much as it
prohibits labor picketing. 
193
On the other hand, several factors support the conclusion that
section 7517 is content-based.194 For instance, the government's purpose
for passing the legislation was obviously to keep the WBC out of
Pennsylvania and prevent the church from protesting at funerals held in
the state. 195 Several legislators even made specific reference to the WBC
during floor debate on the legislation. 96 In this regard, the statute was
not designed to limit any specific idea, but to limit the expressions of a
specific group.
19 7
Other factors also tend to support a finding that section 7517 is
content-based. 98  For instance, the statute is subject to arbitrary
enforcement and is applied to the WBC because of the content of its
message. 199 As mentioned above, members of the Patriot Guard often
attend funerals being picketed by the WBC to prevent the WBC's
message from being heard.20 0  The Patriot Guard Riders often form a
barrier between WBC protestors and funeral attendees and rev their
motorcycle engines to drown out the WBC's protest chants.20 These
Patriot Guard Riders are often considered invited guests at the funeral
188. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984).
189. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1980).
190. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 7517.
193. Id.
194. See Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 804, The mere assertion by state legislators, such as
Senator Pippy, that the statute is content-neutral is of no consequence. See Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994).
195. See H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
196. See sources cited supra note 195.
197. See id.
198. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984).
199. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006).
200. See Riders, Home, supra note 9.
201. Id.
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and, consequently, they are not prosecuted under the statute. 20 2 In effect,
those persons wishing to support mourning families are encouraged to
speak, while those spreading messages funeral attendees disagree with
are prohibited from speaking.20 3 All of these considerations support a
finding that section 7517 is content-based.20 4
Because section 7517 contains both content-based and content-
neutral components, to determine whether the statute as a whole is
content-neutral, the relevant inquiry is whether the statute is
predominately content-based. 20 5 Although section 7517 was passed in
response to activities of the WBC, 20 6 it is predominately content-neutral
because it prohibits all protest activities within 500 feet of a funeral that
are not part of the service.20 7 Moreover, the law is not content-based
because it does not favor or disfavor a certain type of speech on its
face.208 Quite the opposite, the statute disfavors all speech within 500
feet of a commemorative service. 20 9  Additionally, the statute is
supported by the content-neutral justification of preventing all
interferences with funerals. 210  Accordingly, section 7517 is content-
neutral.2t
202. Id. Some legislatures have even passed resolutions commending the Patriot
Guard Riders for insulating funeral services from the WBC. See H.R. 6038, 2006 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006); H.R. 6014, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006); S. Res. 535,
109th Cong. (2006); H.R. Res. 731, 109th Cong. (2006).
203. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (permitting activities that are considered
"part" of the commemorative service).
204. Under the reasoning of Justice O'Connor in Boos v. Barry, Pennsylvania's
statute would likely be considered content-based. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988) (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Because section 7517 was designed to prevent the
potential impact protesting at commemorative services would have on funeral attendees,
the government's sole interest would be to protect the dignity of deceased persons and
their families. Id. According to O'Connor, the statute would be content-based because
protecting the "dignity" of funeral attendees would necessarily require an evaluation of
the content of the speech. Id. This portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion was not,
however, joined by a majority of the court. Id.
205. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
206. See H.R. 190-37, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); S. 190-27, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
207. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b).
208. Id. § 7517; see also Rebecca Bland, Note, The Respect for America's Fallen
Heroes Act: Conflicting Interests Raise Hell With the First Amendment, 75 U. MO. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 523, 536 (2006) [hereinafter Bland, Respect for America's Fallen Heroes
Act] (making similar argument regarding the Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act);
Megan Dunn, Note, The Right to Rest in Peace: Missouri Prohibits Protesting at
Funerals, 71 Mo. L. REV. 1117, 1132-33 (2006) [hereinafter Dunn, The Right to Rest in
Peace] (drawing similar conclusion respecting Missouri's funeral protest law).
209. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b).
210. Id.; see also McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (preventing interferences with
funerals was content-neutral justification).
211. See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156 Civ. C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at *2-3
(W.D. Mo. 2007) (concluding Missouri's funeral picketing statute was likely content-
neutral for similar reasons). But see Andrea Cornwell, Comment, A Final Salute to Lost
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2. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest
The level of scrutiny used to examine the constitutionally of a
statute depends on whether the statute is content-neutral.212 Content-
based statutes are subject to strict scrutiny and must be "necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and... narrowly drawn to achieve that
end., 213 Content-neutral statutes, on the other hand, are reviewed under
an intermediate level of scrutiny.2 4 Rather than serving a compelling
government interest, content-neutral statutes need only serve a
significant government interest. 215  Additionally, the statute must be
narrowly tailored to serve the government interest.
21 6
Because Pennsylvania's statute prohibiting protests at funerals is
predominantly content-neutral, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny.1 7
Accordingly, the government must demonstrate that it has a significant
interest in prohibiting protests at funerals and that the statute is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.21 8
a. Significant Government Interest
The government has the burden of justifying its interest in
prohibiting speech.21 9 It must show "that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these
harms in a direct and material way., 220  Additionally, the government
Soldiers: Preserving the Freedom of Speech at Military Funerals, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
1329, 1351 (2007) [hereinafter Cornwell, A Final Salute to Lost Soldiers] (concluding the
Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act is content based because it favors speech that is
part of a funeral ceremony and disfavors speech that is not).
212. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
213. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 766 (1994) (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 642 (1994); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). Strict scrutiny of content-based statutes is necessary to ensure
that the government has not prohibited speech simply because it disagrees with the
speaker's message. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536.
214. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
215. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 190 (1997).
216. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 535.
217. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
218. Id.
219. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 309 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment requires the Government to justify
every instance of abridgment."); see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 658 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
220. Turner, 512 U.S. at 664. Still, the Court gives deference to Congress. See id. at
665.
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interest must be unrelated to the suppression of speech or ideas.221 The
validity of a statute depends on whether the statute serves the
government interest overall, rather than whether the government interest
is served in any given case.222
The Supreme Court has recognized several government interests
that justify restrictions on freedom of speech.223 Recognized substantial
government interests include raising armies that function quickly and
efficiently,224 "assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective
Service certificates, 225  preventing the disruption of schools,
226
maintaining national parks in an attractive condition,2 27 protecting
residential privacy,228 preventing unwelcome noise, 229 maintaining an
230efficient and pleasant public transportation system, ensuring public
health,23' promoting public safety and order,232 enhancing national
*233 234security, ensuring access to health care facilities, preventing
congestion on fair grounds,235 maintaining the flow of traffic on public
23623sidewalks and streets,2  protecting private property rights,237 and, in
238some circumstances, protecting individual privacy.
On the other hand, statutes prohibiting speech are not justifiable on
the grounds that speech relating to some topics is more prone to incite
violence or produce fear.239 The First Amendment protects all speech
221. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
805 (1984); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186, 189 (1997).
222. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 652-53 (concluding the effect an exemption for one
particular group would have on government interest is not the standard).
223. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
224. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968).
225. Id.
226. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
227. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984).
228. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
229. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989); see also Members
of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984).
230. See Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 806; Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-
03 (1974).
231. See Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 822 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232. Id.; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994).
233. See Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 822 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000).
235. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-53
(1981).
236. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768.
237. Id.
238. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470 (1980); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
239. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972) (rejecting argument
that ordinance prohibiting all peaceful non-labor picketing was justifiable since non-labor
picketing was more likely to result in violence); see also Heffron, 452 U.S. at 662
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[U]ndifferentiated fear or
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regardless of the possible effect it may have on its intended audience.24 °
Indeed, the government does not have an interest in restricting speech on
the basis that society may find it offensive.24' Offensive speech cannot,
however, be "so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it."
242
Under this exception, an individual's right to be let alone must be
balanced against another individual's right to freedom of speech.243
Whether "offended viewers can effectively avoid further bombardment
of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes" is relevant to the
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression." (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)))
(alteration in original). Non-communicative conduct that is independent of speech, on
the other hand, may be prohibited. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382
(1968). Similarly, preventing visual and verbal assaults may justify a prohibition. See
Hill, 530 U.S. at 716.
240. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) ("[O]ur own citizens must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment." (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988))) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court in Boos held that
a "dignity" standard was "so inherently subjective that it would be inconsistent with our
longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question may have an
adverse emotional impact on the audience." Id.
241. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 ("The right to free speech, of course, includes the right
to attempt to persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed simply
because the speaker's message may be offensive to his audience."); Boos, 485 U.S. at 321
(opinion of O'Connor, J.); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 547-48 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding offensive
messages should receive constitutional protection while the offensive form in which
speech is communicated may be prohibited).
242. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 487(1988); Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 541-42 ("Where a single speaker
communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment does not permit the government to
prohibit speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid objectional
speech."). Even "good" ideas cannot be forced on unwilling listeners. See Hill, 530 U.S.
at 718. The captive audience theory holds especially true in the context of private
residences where individuals are not required to invite unwanted speech into their homes.
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85; see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 717; Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
243. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 718; Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488 (holding government had
interest in prohibiting speech that was directed at those who were "presumptively
unwilling to receive" it by enacting targeted residential picketing ordinance); Carey, 447
U.S. at 470-71 (Black, J., concurring) (stating the Constitution does not prohibit the
passage of laws "to protect the public from ... conduct that disturbs the tranquility of
spots selected by the people either for homes ... or for public and other buildings that
require peace and quiet to carry out their functions, such as courts, libraries, schools, and
hospitals" (citing Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969))) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Carey, 447 U.S. at 477 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980) ("[T]he ability of
government 'to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it [is] dependent
upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner."' (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971))) (alteration in
original); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
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determination.244
The Court has been careful to limit the circumstances under which
an individual's right to be let alone trumps another individual's freedom
of speech. Initially, such situations were confined to instances where
limiting speech was necessary to protect the privacy and sanctity of the
home.245 In a recent series of cases, however, the Court has extended the
right to be let alone to other situations involving captive audiences. For
instance, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. 246 the Court upheld
portions of an injunction on protests conducted outside abortion clinics in
part because limiting speech was necessary to a woman's right to "seek
pregnancy-related services" and "protect[] the medical privacy of
patients whose psychological and physical well-being were threatened as
they were held 'captive' by medical circumstance. '247  A similar
government interest was recognized in Hill v. Colorado.248 In Hill, the
Court upheld a Colorado statute that prohibited protests within 100 feet
of abortion clinic entrances after recognizing that the government has an
interest in protecting "those who seek medical treatment from the
potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an unwelcome
individual delivers a message (whatever its content) by physically
approaching an individual at close range., 249 The Court in Hill, however,
244. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Consol. Edison
Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) ("[C]ustomers
who encounter an objectionable billing insert [could] 'effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes."'); Cohen, 403 U.S. at
21 (concluding people in courthouse could avert their eyes from jacket worn by
defendant that read "Fuck the Draft").
245. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988). In Frisby, the Court
emphasized the unique nature of the home as a "citadel" and the necessity of preserving
the sanctity of the home. Id. But see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) ("[The]
[s]tate's asserted interest in promoting the privacy of the home is not sufficient to save
the statute.").
246. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
247. Id. at 768. While the Court in Madsen addressed the constitutionality of an
injunction prohibiting protesting, the principles announced by the Court are useful for
statutory analysis as well. See, e.g., McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 986
(E.D. Ky. 2006). In Madsen, the Court held that the Ward time, place, and manner
analysis was "not sufficiently rigorous" for evaluating content-neutral injunctions.
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765. Instead, the First Amendment test for injunctions is "whether
the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to
serve a significant government interest." Id. at 765; see also id. at 791 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this standard as intermediate-
intermediate scrutiny); Schenck, 519 U.S. at 371. A stricter standard was considered
necessary for injunctions because judicial decrees create "greater risks of censorship and
discriminatory application than do general ordinances." Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764.
248. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
249. Id. at 718 n.25. The Court was careful to point out that the government had an
interest in protecting individuals seeking a variety of medical care services-not just
abortions. Id. at 729.
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was careful to clarify that the statute was not justified by a government
interest in protecting an individual's right to privacy.
25 °
The Court has yet to acknowledge a right to mourn in privacy. The
closest it has come to recognizing such a right was in National Archives
and Records Administration v. Favish.25' In Favish, the Court held that
individuals have a right to privacy in controlling the body and death
images of deceased family members, which prevented disclosure of such
images under the Freedom of Information Act.252 The decision did not
address whether the right to privacy included a right to mourn.
25 3
It is unlikely that Pennsylvania's funeral protest statute can be
justified by any significant state interest. 254  The Supreme Court has
either explicitly rejected all of the possible justifications for section 7517
or has yet to recognize them. 5  Although Pennsylvania's interest in
prohibiting protests at funerals is arguably unrelated to the suppression of
speech,256 without a significant government interest, section 7517 is
unconstitutional.
Concerns regarding the effect funeral protests have on mourners do
not justify section 7517's suppression of speech. 57 The statute cannot be
justified on the grounds that people find funeral protests offensive,258 nor
250. Id. at 718 n.25.
251. Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004).
252. Id. Although Favish was concerned with whether the right to control death
images of deceased family members was a right recognized by an exemption in the
Freedom of Information Act, the Court recognized that the right existed at common law
as well. Id.
253. See generally id. Nonetheless, in a recent petition for writ of certiorari an
appellant has requested that the Supreme Court adopt the Northern District of Ohio's
construction of Favish, namely, that Favish supports the conclusion that family members
have a right to privacy at their loved ones' funerals. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Showler v. Harper's Magazine Found., No. 06-1703, 2007 WL 1834003, at *11 (U.S.
2007).
254. But see McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (concluding state had valid interest in
"protecting funeral attendees from unwanted communications that are so obtrusive that
they are impractical to avoid" because "[a] funeral is a deeply personal, emotional and
solemn occasion" and "[i]ts attendees have an interest in avoiding unwanted, obtrusive
communications," which is comparable to an individual's right to keep unwelcome
communications from reaching into his or her home).
255. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000). Although the Court may
be willing to recognize protecting the right to mourn in peace as a significant government
interest in the future, under current standards, the state does not have an interest in
protecting individual privacy to this extent. Id.
256. Pennsylvania's interest would likely be considered unrelated to the suppression
of speech because the statute focuses on protecting the privacy of funerals rather than
suppressing a particular message. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006).
257. But see Dunn, The Right to Rest in Peace, supra note 208, at 1134 (drawing
opposite conclusion of Missouri's interest in enacting its funeral protest law).
258. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
530, 547-48 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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by the fact that funeral protests may result in violence between protestors
and mourners. 259  Preventing the effect funeral protests may have on
mourners is equally inadequate.26 ° Moreover, section 7517 cannot be
justified on the basis that it is protecting unwilling listeners from
intrusive speech.26' WBC protests are not so intrusive that unwilling
audiences cannot avoid them.2 62 Funeral attendees do not constitute a
captive audience because they can easily avert their eyes from WBC
protestors and protest signs.263 Mourners could also easily choose to pay
their final respects in a more secluded setting such as a private funeral
home or residence.26 4 Although it may be considered noble for
legislators to attempt to insulate mourners from harsh messages, it is not
constitutionally justifiable.
Legislators' concerns regarding the dignity of the deceased and
family members' right to mourn in peace also provide insufficient
support for section 7517's restriction on speech.265 Protecting the dignity
and honor of the dead is unlikely to be considered a significant
government interest in light of the Supreme Court's precedent.26 6
Similarly, the Court has not recognized a right to moum in peace.
Favish dealt solely with disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act and only recognized family members' right to control death images
and the body of deceased family members.2 67 The case did not address
the validity of restrictions made on speech to protect individuals who
259. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972).
260. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).
261. See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100.
262. See WBC FAQ: Soldier, supra note 60.
263. See Cornwell, A Final Salute to Lost Soldiers, supra note 211, at 1358
(concluding that "[c]emetery visitors ... are not bound to the cemetery property by any
condition, such as treatment at a clinic, but choose to attend the services at a public
location"). But see McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
(holding individuals attending funerals comprise a "captive audience" similar to patients
entering health care facilities because "they must go to the place designated for the
memorial event" if they wish to take part in a commemorative service); Phelps-Roper v.
Taft, No. 1:06 Civ. 2038, 2007 WL 915109, at *5 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (similar); Stephen R.
McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 575, 604
(2007) [hereinafter McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws] (similar); Dunn, The Right to
Rest in Peace, supra note 208, at 1135 (similar).
264. See Comwell, A Final Salute to Lost Soldiers, supra note 211, at 1358 (drawing
similar conclusion).
265. But see Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156 Civ. C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at
*3 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (concluding Missouri's funeral protest statute is likely justified by
the state's interest in protecting funeral attendees).
266. In Boos v. Barry, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that the government
has an interest in limiting speech to protect other individuals' dignity. See Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).
267. Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004); see
also Cornwell, A Final Salute to Lost Soldiers, supra note 211, at 1365 (drawing similar
conclusion).
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choose to mourn in public.2 68 Additionally, the Court has been hesitant
to recognize any general right to privacy as trumping another person's
right to freedom of speech outside the context of a person's private
home. 269 Balancing an individual's right to be left alone in public against
another individual's right to protest in public necessarily favors the
latter.27° Once individuals begin mourning outside of the privacy of their
own homes or other private establishments, any interest in being left
alone they may have had disappears. 27' Accordingly, mourners do not
have any general right to be left alone when they choose to mourn in
public.272
Other government interests recognized by the court cannot be used
to support section 7517's prohibition on speech. First, ensuring access
does not support the statute because there is no evidence that funeral
protestors have consistently blocked access to churches or cemeteries
where commemorative services are held.273  Second, the statute's
prohibition cannot be justified as necessary to ensure a "healthy
environment" or an individual's physical well-being.274 Third, the statute
is not necessary to further public safety because there is no evidence that
funeral protestors engage in violent activities or disrupt the free flow of
traffic.275 Even if the funeral protests did disrupt traffic, it is unclear that
the government's interest in regulating traffic would be sufficient on its
own to justify the broad prohibition of section 7517. Finally, section
7517 is not necessary to ensure access to medical services.276 Any
interest the state may have in ensuring access to medical treatment has no
connection to prohibitions on protests at funerals. Additionally, it is
doubtful that mourning in public can be equated with receiving medically
277necessary services. For the foregoing reasons, section 7517 is not
supported by a significant government interest.
268. See generally id.
269. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988). But see Bland, Respect for
America's Fallen Heroes Act, supra note 208, at 533 (arguing that past precedent
indicates that the "Court would acknowledge a private funeral as a right guaranteed to
every American under the Fourteenth Amendment").
270. See Collins & Hudson, supra note 13, at 66.
271. Id.
272. Id.; see also Cornwell, A Final Salute to Lost Soldiers, supra note 211, at 1363.
But see Dunn, The Right to Rest in Peace, supra note 208, at 1135 (concluding that
funeral attendees are a captive audience).
273. See WBC: Legislation, supra note 40.
274. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 990 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
(characterizing Madsen as "only recogniz[ing] a state's interest in protecting individuals
held captive by medical circumstances from unwanted communications that negatively
affect their physical well-being").
275. See WBC: Legislation, supra note 40.
276. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(a).
277. See Collins & Hudson, supra note 13, at 66.
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b. Narrowly Tailored
To be narrowly tailored, a statute must prohibit or target only "the
exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy., 278 The burdens a statute
imposes must be equal to the benefits it provides.279  Further, the
provisions of the statute should be related to the interests it is intended to
further.28°
Under intermediate scrutiny, it is enough that the government
interest "would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation., 28'
The government may use whatever means it chooses "so long as the...
regulation promotes a [significant] governmental interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and does not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further that interest.
282
Absolute prohibitions on speech are only narrowly tailored if every form
of speech banned by the statute is an evil that the state may appropriately
target.283
Although a content-neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to
serve the government's interest, this requirement does not impose a
burden on government to use the least restrictive means to meet its
284objective. The existence of an alternative that may impose fewerlimitations on freedom of speech does not, by itself, affect the validity of
278. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
279. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 216 (1997).
280. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297 (1984).
281. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States
v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Clark, 468 U.S. at 297 (ban on sleeping in public parks was valid since the "parks would
be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than with it").
282. Turner, 520 U.S. at 213-14 (internal quotations omitted); see also Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). The ordinance challenged in Frisby v.
Schultz provides an example of narrow tailoring. In Frisby, the Court upheld an
ordinance that prohibited picketing in front of private residences and dwellings. See
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482. The Court held that the statute was narrowly tailored since it
only prohibited targeted picketing in front of a particular residence and, under the text of
the ordinance, general marches or protests through residential neighborhoods were
permissible. Id. at 483.
283. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485. Promoting aesthetics is an example of a
justification for a complete prohibition on a certain forms of speech. See Members of
City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984) (city ordinance
banning the posting of signs on public property was justified by the city's interest in
aesthetics because the substantive evil sought to be prevented was "created by the
medium of expression itself').
284. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 736 (2000)
(Souter, J., concurring); Turner, 512 U.S. at 662 (1994). The Court does not employ a
least-restrictive means test despite the use of similar language in United States v.
O'Brien. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968) (concluding there were
"no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly" assure the legitimate
government interest).
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a regulation.285 The First Amendment only requires the presence of
"reasonable factual findings supported by evidence" for a legislative
determination to be made.286
Fixed buffer zones that prohibit speech within a specific distance of
certain locations are narrowly tailored if they burden no more speech
than necessary to serve the legitimate government interest. Thus far, the
Court has only upheld relatively small buffer zones. In Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,287 the Court upheld a provision of an
injunction that prohibited protesting within a thirty-six-foot buffer zone
around clinic entranceways as a valid mechanism to ensure clinic
access.288  The Court reasoned that, aside from the thirty-six-foot
entryway buffer zone, no other practical means existed to ensure access
to clinics in light of aggressive conduct exhibited by the protesters.289
Additionally, the buffer zone still permitted individuals entering and
exiting the clinic to see and hear demonstrators across the street.2 90 The
Court, however, struck down a portion of the buffer zone as applied to
private property surrounding the clinic entrances because there was no
evidence that protestors used private property to prevent clinic access
and the provision burdened more speech than necessary to serve the
government's interests. 291 The Court also struck down a 300-foot "no-
approach" zone around the clinic because it would be hard "to justify a
prohibition on all uninvited approaches" without "evidence that the
protesters' speech is independently proscribable (i.e., 'fighting words' or
threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a
threat of physical harm. 292 Along the same lines, the Court struck down
a requirement that patients give consent before being approached
because the provision burdened more speech than necessary to achieve
the government's purpose. 93 Lastly, the Court invalidated a provision
that prohibited all "images observable" because it was overly
285. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797; see also Turner, 520 U.S. at 217-18; United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). But see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S.
180, 252-53 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment does
not impose a "least-restrictive-means" requirement, however, the presence of less
restrictive means are relevant in analyzing the reasonableness of the regulation and the
interest it is supposed to serve).
286. Turner, 520 U.S. at 224-25.
287. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
288. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-70, 776. The Court also upheld a noise restriction
because it was a legitimate method to maintain a healthy environment for patients. Id. at
776.
289. Id. at 769-70; see also Schenck, 519 U.S. at 373.
290. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770.
291. Id. at 771.
292. Id. at 774.
293. Id. at 774, 776.
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burdensome on speech and patients could avoid images on protest signs
294by averting their eyes or closing the clinic curtains.
Floating buffer zones295 have been upheld as narrowly tailored in
limited circumstances. In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western
New York, 296 the Supreme Court upheld provisions of an injunction that
placed fixed buffer zones around abortion clinics and struck down
portions of the injunction that imposed floating buffer zones.297  The
injunction prohibited blocking or demonstrating within fifteen feet of
clinic doorways, parking lots, and driveway entrances and demonstrating
"within [fifteen] feet of any person" entering or exiting the clinic. 298 The
Court invalidated the floating buffer zone established by the injunction
that prohibited demonstrating around individuals entering or exiting the
clinic. 299  The Court reasoned the floating buffer zone was overly
burdensome and prohibited more speech than necessary to serve the
government's interests because it prevented protestors from conveying
their message at a "normal conversational distance" and from
distributing pamphlets to clinic patrons and other individuals walking on
the sidewalks.30 ° Moreover, the floating buffer zone prohibited speech
on public sidewalks, which are a traditional public forum and an area
where speech receives the greatest protection.30' Floating buffer zones
294. Id. at 770, 773. Noise, on the other hand, was not as easy to shut out. Id. at 770.
295. Floating buffer zones are no-speech zones that prohibit speech within a certain
distance of a particular person, place, or object.
296. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
297. See id. at 361. The injunction in Schenck was issued in response to conduct of
individuals who protested outside of abortion clinics by forming blockades in front of the
clinic driveways, doorways, and entrances to prevent patients and employees from
entering the facilities. Id. at 362. Several protestors trespassed onto clinic property and
some protestors entered the clinic itself. Id. Some protestors even jumped onto cars
entering clinic parking lots, shouted in the faces of women entering the clinic, pushed and
shoved female patients walking into the clinic, and elbowed and spitted on volunteers
escorting patients into the clinics. Id. at 363.
298. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y. v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417,
1440-41 (1992). The injunction also included an exception for sidewalk counselors
engaging in non-threatening conversations with people entering or leaving the clinic. Id.;
see also Schenck, 519 U.S. at 367. Under the terms of the injunction sidewalk counselors
within the buffer zones were required to "cease and desist" by retreating fifteen feet if the
individual entering or exiting the clinic made clear that she did not wish to receive the
counseling. See Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. at 1440-41; see also Schenck, 519 U.S. at
367.
299. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997).
300. Id. at 377-379.
301. Id. at 377. The Court noted that in some situations a floating buffer zone might
be permissible but based on the record before it, a floating buffer zone could not be
upheld. Id. A floating buffer zone would require a speaker to move along with the
individual entering or exiting a clinic to maintain the fifteen-foot distance which,
according to the Court, would make it difficult for the demonstrator to convey his
message, especially in areas where maintaining the fifteen-foot distance would require
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around vehicles entering or exiting clinic parking lots were also held
invalid.3 °2 The Court reasoned that the buffer zones burdened more
speech than necessary since they "restrict the speech of those who simply
line the sidewalk or curb in an effort to chant, shout, or hold signs
peacefully., 30 3 The Court did, however, uphold fifteen-foot fixed buffer
zones around the entrances and doorways to clinics because they
furthered public safety by limiting dangerous interactions between cars
and protestors and fights that were likely to develop.30 4
Thus far, the Court has only recognized fixed buffer zones of up to
100 feet and floating buffer zones of up to eight feet. In Hill v.
Colorado,3 °5 the Court upheld a Colorado statute that regulated speech
within 100 feet of entrances to health care facilities. 30 6 Another section
of the statute prohibited knowingly approaching within eight feet of
another person without his or her consent "for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest,
education, or counseling with such other person. 30 7  In determining
whether the statute was narrowly tailored, the Court noted that the place
where speech was restricted was relevant.30 8 The Court noted that
individuals entering or exiting health care clinics "are often in
particularly vulnerable physical and emotional conditions., 30 9  The
Colorado statute was a modest restriction on demonstrators' rights that
served the state's legitimate interest in protecting clinic patrons. 310 The
the protestor to walk in the street or prohibit communication altogether. Id. Further,
floating buffer zones create uncertainty about whether the demonstrators are in
compliance with the injunction at any given moment, which discourages expression
altogether. Id. at 378.
302. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 380.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 375-76, 380. According to the Court, the demonstrator's prior conduct of
blocking entrances to clinics and harassing the police to the point that officers were
unable to respond effectively to the situation supported the injunction's prohibition
around entrances since it was the only way to ensure access. Id. at 380. Similarly, the
buffer zone was necessary because a ban on blocking access alone would not suffice. Id.
at 382. The Court did not address the validity of the fifteen-foot distance, but instead
deferred to the lower Court's determination of how many feet were necessary to ensure
clinic access. Id. at 381.
305. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
306. See id. at 730.
307. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-22(3) (1999); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 707. The
statute only prohibited protestors from approaching those entering the facility; it did not
require stationary protestors to move away from passers-by. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
9-22(3). Additionally, the statute did not prohibit other forms of protest or
demonstration. Id.; see also Hill, 530 U.S. 707-08.
308. Hill, 530 U.S. at 728. The Court noted that the government has a substantial
interest in regulating speech in particular places such as schools, polling places,
courthouses, private residences, and health care facilities. Id.
309. Id. at 729.
310. Id.
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statute's eight-foot floating buffer zone was also upheld as
constitutional. 31  The Court reasoned that an eight-foot floating buffer
zone did not negatively impact the ability of demonstrators' signs to be
viewed and read for several reasons.31 2 First, it only proscribed
communications within eight feet of unwilling listeners.313 Second, it
only had effect within 100 feet of a health care facility.31 4 Third, unlike
the fifteen-foot floating buffer zone in Schenk, it permitted demonstrators
to communicate their message at a "normal conversational distance. 3t 5
Fourth, the "knowingly approach" provision of the statute allowed
demonstrators to stay in place while speaking, even as people passed by
them.316 The "knowing" requirement prevented demonstrators who
inadvertently came within the eight-foot zone from being in violation of
the statute.317  Finally, the prophylactic eight-foot buffer zone was
necessary to prevent subjective enforcement and the problems associated
with protecting clinic patients from harassment on a case-by-case
basis.318
Section 7517 is not narrowly tailored for several reasons. The
statute is overly burdensome and prohibits more speech than necessary to
prevent the evil it seeks to remedy. It also prevents individuals from
engaging in several forms of highly valued speech. The facts that the
burdens of the statute outweigh its benefits and not all of the restrictions
are related to the state's interest in prohibiting speech are additional
considerations that support the conclusion that the statute is not narrowly
tailored. The breadth of the statute's buffer zones also poses problems.
311. See id. at 726. The Court deferred to the legislature's judgment regarding
whether the eight-foot distance was the "best solution." Id. at 727.
312. See id. at 726. On the contrary, the Court reasoned that the eight-foot buffer
might enhance the readability of demonstrator's signs since it would prevent people from
obstructing the view of the signs. Id. at 726-28. Additionally, the statute did not regulate
the content or design of the demonstrators' posters or affect demonstrators who remained
in place while holding signs. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 727.
313. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 727-28 (2000). According to the Court, the
statute still gave adequate protection to demonstrators to convey their messages to
unwilling listeners. Id. at 727. The statute did not create a "heckler's veto" because
demonstrators could still engage in speech, it merely prohibited speech if the
demonstrator knowingly approached within eight feet of an unwilling listener. Id. at 734.
314. Id. at 729-30.
315. Id. at 727-28. The Court recognized that a speaker's ability to be heard may be
impaired by loud background noise or other demonstrators, however, the Court noted that
the statute did not limit the number of demonstrators, the use of amplification devices, or
the noise level. Id. at 727.
316. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 727.
317. Id.
318. Id. But see Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
663 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Broad prophylactic
rules in the area of free expression are suspect." (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980))) (internal citation marks omitted).
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Although any interest the state may have in prohibiting protests at
commemorative services would likely be served less effectively absent
the statute, the statute is not narrowly tailored because it prohibits such a
wide variety of legal activities.
319
Pennsylvania's funeral protest statute is overly burdensome. 320 The
statute prohibits all demonstration activities within 500 feet of a
commemorative service and makes no exceptions for private property
uses. 32 1 Under the statute, the owner of a home that is located within 500
feet of a church or cemetery where a funeral is taking place is precluded
from demonstrating on his own private property one hour before, during,
or one hour after a funeral.322 Because "demonstration activity" is
defined to include displaying any "placard, sign, banner, flag or similar
device" that is not "part of a commemorative service," a homeowner
could be prosecuted under the law for placing a political sign in his front
yard, hanging a banner, or even flying an American flag during the
proscribed time period.323 The fact that numerous commemorative
services could be held on one day makes the prohibition even more
burdensome because it has the potential to silence speech for several
hours each day. Even on days where only two services are held, speech
within the 500-foot zone would be prohibited for at least four hours.
Additionally, it is unnecessary to include private property within the 500-
foot no-protest zone because there is no evidence that demonstrators use
private property to protest at funerals. In light of the unnecessary
restrictions on speech engaged in on private property, it is difficult to
conclude that the statute is narrowly tailored.
Section 7517 prohibits several forms of highly valued speech.324
For instance, the statute prohibits distributing handbills, pamphlets, or
leaflets within the 500-foot no-protest zone.325 Anyone from a political
candidate distributing literature to a student advertising a school activity
falls within the broad reach of the statute.326 Additionally, the statute
prohibits "any oration, speech or use of sound amplification
equipment ... that is not part of a commemorative service. 3 27 Read
literally, this provision prohibits a conversation between two people who
are not a part of the service but who are within 500 feet of the ceremony
319. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).





325. Id. § 7517(b).
326. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517; see also McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F.
Supp. 2d 975, 996 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
327. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(c) (emphasis added).
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during the relevant time period. Whether the people are sitting on a front
porch or walking down a sidewalk, their speech is unlawful if it is within
500 feet of a commemorative service.
328
The burdens imposed by section 7517 significantly outweigh any
benefits the statute may convey. By creating such a large no-protest
zone and prohibiting such a wide range of activities, the statute
effectively places a duty on citizens to be informed of the dates,
locations, and times of commemorative services to ensure that they do
not violate the statute. Such a burden is an extremely unrealistic
expectation, especially in areas with a high concentration of churches
and cemeteries. Additionally, the fact that the statute's prohibition
includes speech on public sidewalks and other traditional public fora,
which are traditionally used for protests and are held in trust for the
public, supports the conclusion that the law is not narrowly tailored.329
Not all of the provisions in section 7517 are related to the interests
the government intended to protect.330 For instance, the statute prohibits
demonstration activities one hour before, during, and one hour after a
commemorative service. 331 Even if the government has a significant
interest in protecting the sanctity of funerals, the time limitation burdens
substantially more speech than necessary to serve the government
objective.332 Preventing protests before and after funeral ceremonies
does nothing to ensure an attendee's right to mourn in peace or to protect
the dignity of the deceased.333 Attendees are not exposed to speech that
occurs within 500 feet of the location of the service before they arrive or
after they leave. Accordingly, any interest they may have in mourning in
private is not diminished by speech engaged in at these times. Even if
attendees gather before and after the service, because the ceremony is not
underway, their right to a private funeral does not justify the
restriction.334 Additionally, the statute prohibits demonstration activities
that funeral attendees cannot even see or hear.335  Protestors could
328. Id. § 7517; see also Bland, Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, supra note
208, at 532 (making similar observation of Kentucky's funeral protest statute).
329. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 996 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
330. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517; see also McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at
995-96 (concluding Kentucky funeral protest statute was not narrowly tailored because it
prohibited more than just interferences with funeral services).
331. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b) (West 2006).
332. Id.; see also McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 995-96 (E.D. Ky.
2006).
333. See McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 995-96.
334. But see Dunn, The Right to Rest in Peace, supra note 208, at 1135 ("Because
funeral attendees often arrive early to help with preparation or privately pay their
respects, and because some may stay after completion of the service ... it was reasonable
for the legislature to proscribe protesting [one hour before and after a funeral].).
335. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b); see also McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at
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conceivably be within 500 feet of a commemorative service and still be
out of the attendees' views. 336 Because the purpose of the statute is to
prevent interferences with funerals, 337 the portions of the statute that
prohibit activities unknown to funeral attendees or that do not disrupt the
service are not narrowly tailored.338
The breadth of the buffer zones established by section 7517 also
supports the conclusion that the statute is not narrowly tailored. The
500-foot no-protest zone established by section 7517 is significantly
broader than thirty-six foot fixed buffer zone upheld in Madsen and the
fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone upheld in Schenck.339 Similarly, the buffer
zone established by section 7517 is five times the distance of the buffer
zone upheld in Hill and considerably larger than the 300-foot no-
approach zone the Court struck down in Madsen.340  Moreover, the
statute's prohibition on the "display of any placard, sign, banner, flag or
similar device" within 500 feet of a funeral is overly burdensome on
speech just like the "images observable" prohibition in Madsen.341 If
patients in Madsen could avert their eyes from protest signs near
clinics, 342 funeral attendees can equally be expected to do the same.
Under the standards set forth in Schenck, the floating buffer zone
established by section 7517 is not narrowly tailored.343 Pennsylvania's
funeral picketing statute does not establish floating buffer zones around
funeral attendees, however, it does establish a 500-foot floating buffer
zone around funeral processions. 344  Because the statute prohibits
demonstrating at commemorative services, which includes
"procession[s] to a cemetery," the statute effectively establishes a 500-
996 (concluding Kentucky funeral protest statute was not narrowly tailored for similar
reason).
336. At this distance, however, attendees may still be able to hear protesters even if
they cannot see them.
337. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(a).
338. See McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 995-96. But see Bland, Respect for America's
Fallen Heroes Act, supra note 208, at 537-38 (arguing that Respect for America's Fallen
Heroes Act's time restriction on protests within one hour of funeral services is narrowly
tailored).
339. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b) (West 2006). Although the Court in
Schenck did not address the appropriateness of the fifteen-foot fixed buffer zones around
clinic entrances, the 500-foot buffer zone established by section 7517 is significantly
more burdensome than the fixed buffer zone approved in Schenck.
340. Id. § 7517(b).
341. Id. § 7517(c).
342. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994).
343. Id. § 7517(b); see also Bland, Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, supra
note 208, at 539 (making similar conclusion regarding the 150-foot floating buffer zone
in the Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act).
344. Id. § 7517(c).
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foot floating buffer zone along processional routes.345 Under this
provision, any person who happens to be speaking, picketing,
distributing literature, or displaying a sign within 500 feet of the
processional route has violated the statute.346 This broad prohibition
takes within its sweep a wide variety of conduct and imposes an
excessive burden on citizens to keep record of the route, time, and day of
all funeral processions.347
The 500-foot floating buffer zone created by section 7517 is not
narrowly tailored for several reasons.348 First, like the floating buffer
zone struck down in Schenck, it prevents protestors from conveying their
message at a normal conversational distance. 349 Second, the 500-foot
floating buffer zone is over thirty times greater than the floating buffer
zone struck down as overly broad in Schenck.350 Third, unlike the eight-
foot floating buffer zone upheld in Hill, it negatively impacts mourners'
ability to view demonstrators' signs and hear the protestors' oral
communications. 35' Fourth, section 7517 is not limited by a "knowingly
approach" requirement like the floating buffer upheld in Hill.352 Under
section 7517, even protestors who are unaware that they are within 500
feet of a commemorative service are within the scope of the statute's
prohibition.353 Fifth, it imposes a 500-foot zone at any given location
along a processional route unlike the floating buffer zone in Hill, which
only applied within 100 feet of a health care facility.354 For all of the
foregoing reasons, section 7517 is not narrowly tailored.
3. Alternative Channels of Communication
Alternative channels of communication exist when a regulation on
speech permits a speaker's message to be conveyed in another manner.355
Whether there is a barrier to delivering the message to the media and
whether other aspects of the demonstration are still permissible are
relevant considerations in determining whether alternative channels of
345. Id.; see also Phelps-Roper v. Taft, No. 1:06 Civ. 2038, 2007 WL 915109, at *6
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (concluding a similar provision in Ohio's statute was a floating buffer
zone).
346. Id. § 7517(b).
347. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b).
348. See Taft, 2007 WL 915109, at *6 (concluding 300-foot floating buffer zone in
Ohio's funeral picketing statute was not narrowly tailored).
349. Id.





355. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
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communication exist. 356 Other factors to consider include whether the
form of communication is a "uniquely valuable or important mode of
communication," or whether the speaker's "ability to communicate
effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression.
3 57
Absent a showing that other channels of communication are insufficient
to communicate a speaker's message, the fact that a restriction may
reduce the size of a speaker's audience is of little consequence and does
little to restrict the channels of communication.
358
Section 7517 does nothing to prohibit the WBC's message from
being conveyed in other manners. 359 Nothing in the statute prevents the
WBC from protesting 501 feet from a commemorative service or even
from protesting directly adjacent to a church or cemetery when a
commemorative service is not under'ay (as long as the protest is not
within one hour of a service).360 Additionally, the WBC still has a wide
variety of means to convey its message. 36' For instance, the church has
been very successful at conveying its message through television, radio,
the Internet, and other media.362  These alternative channels of
communication likely increase the size of the WBC's audience rather
than restrict it. 363 Accordingly, section 7517 permits speakers to convey
356. Id. (concluding ban on sleeping in public parks left ample channels for
communicating the problems of the homeless since the protestors could still create a
symbolic city, use protest signs, and conduct vigils).
357. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812
(1984). Analysis of these factors may require consideration of the costs of alternatives so
as not to eliminate the less-expensive forms of communication and adversely affect
individuals who have low incomes. See id. at 812 n.30. This is not to suggest that all
inexpensive forms of communication should receive absolute protection. Id. (noting that
sound truck may reach a large number of people at relatively low cost but it still is a
nuisance); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
536 (1980) (making similar observation); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 549-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (ban on graffiti was
constitutional even though graffiti artists may not have other equally effective means of
communicating).
358. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding
regulation imposing restriction on volume of communication because the speech was still
allowed in the same location and did not affect the content or quality of the speech).
359. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West 2006).
360. Id.; see also Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156 Civ. C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437,
at *4 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (reaching similar conclusion regarding Missouri's funeral protest
law); Phelps-Roper v. Taft, No. 1:06 Civ. 2038, 2007 WL 915109, at *6 (N.D. Ohio
2007) (drawing similar conclusion about Ohio's statute).
361. See Bland, Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, supra note 208, at 537
(making similar argument); see also Hollingsworth, Trade is Phelps Sign of Times, supra
note 44, at 1. But see Comwell, A Final Salute to Lost Soldiers, supra note 211, at 1371
(concluding that "cyberspace cannot replace the powerful symbolism of actually being at
a street protest with others").
362. See Hollingsworth, Trade is Phelps Sign of Times, supra note 44, at 1.
363. It is arguable however, that the WBC would not have access to these types of
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their messages through alternative channels of communication.
IV. Conclusion
Despite Pennsylvania's perhaps well-intended attempt to protect the
sanctity of funerals, section 7517 will likely be held unconstitutional.
While the statute is content-neutral and leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication, it does not further a significant government
interest and is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.364  To be
constitutional, a statute must satisfy all four requirements.365 Therefore,
section 7517's constitutional defects can only be cured if the statute is
drafted to serve a significant government interest and its provisions are
narrowly tailored to further that interest.
366
It is unlikely that Pennsylvania's funeral protest statute can be
reformulated to serve a significant government interest. Only if the
Supreme Court is willing to recognize a general right to privacy at
funerals or a right to mourn will state legislation prohibiting funeral
protests be constitutional. So far, the Supreme Court's recognition of the
government's interest in protecting an individual's right to privacy has
been limited to the context of the private home.367 Additionally, it has
not acknowledged a general right to mourn, only the right to control the
death images and body of a deceased family member.368
Even if the Supreme Court were willing to recognize a government
interest in protecting privacy, the statute would still need to be narrowly
tailored.369 Thus far, the Court has only been willing to uphold no-
protest buffer zones of up to 100 feet and floating buffer zones of up to
eight feet.370 The 500-foot fixed buffer zone created by section 7517 is
substantially larger than any buffer zone that has been upheld and,
therefore, will likely be unconstitutional.371 Similarly, a circumstance in
which a 500-foot floating buffer zone such as the one contained in
section 7517 will be upheld is very unlikely.
media if it did not protest at funerals because, absent its protest activities, the group
would be largely unknown. See Comwell, A Final Salute to Lost Soldiers, supra note
211, at 1371 ("The WBC could not have achieved such notoriety without interacting with
the targeted audience in this way." (referring to the group's demonstrations at
cemeteries)).
364. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517.
365. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
366. Id.
367. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988).
368. See Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
369. See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
370. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000).
371. See McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 995-96 (concluding 300-foot no-protest zone
was likely unconstitutional).
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The statute would have a better chance of surviving constitutional
scrutiny if the breadth of the buffer zones were reduced and exceptions
were made for speech on certain types of property. For instance,
exceptions should be made for speech engaged in on private property and
traditional public fora. Limiting the statute's prohibition to areas
necessary for mourners to enter and exit commemorative services would
also increase the statute's likelihood of being upheld.372 Another
possible solution would be to rely on private entities to prohibit protests
on their property. Churches and cemeteries could pass rules or
regulations prohibiting unapproved demonstrations during funeral
ceremonies. The value of such prohibitions would likely be limited,
however, because the WBC does not conduct its protests inside of
cemeteries or on church property.
Perhaps the best way to prevent protesting at memorial services is to
ignore the WBC altogether. While this may be easier said than done,
depriving the WBC of the attention it receives from its protests activities
would likely result in a reduced number of protests.373 Ignoring the
WBC would probably not halt all protests though, considering the group
continued to engage in protest activities during the 1990's when its
media exposure was considerably more limited.
In conclusion, the current trend of enacting restrictive statutes to
prohibit protests at funerals is not a constitutional solution to the "WBC
problem., 374 Although some states' statutes may have features that make
them more likely to be held constitutional than others, many statutes,
including Pennsylvania's, have the effect of restricting unnecessarily
large amounts of speech. It is true that no family should have to endure
additional hardship when mourning the loss of a loved one who died
serving their country; nonetheless, the right to speak freely is one of the
fundamental rights that those individuals died to defend.
372. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws, supra note 263, at 607 (making similar
observation).
373. See McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws, supra note 263, at 577, 609-10 (making
similar observation).
374. See Collins & Hudson, supra note 13, at 66.
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